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Accumulating infections of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in humans underlines the need to track the ability
of these viruses to spread among humans. A human-transmissible avian influenza virus is expected to cause clusters of
infections in humans living in close contact. Therefore, epidemiological analysis of infection clusters in human
households is of key importance. Infection clusters may arise from transmission events from (i) the animal reservoir, (ii)
humans who were infected by animals (primary human-to-human transmission), or (iii) humans who were infected by
humans (secondary human-to-human transmission). Here we propose a method of analysing household infection data
to detect changes in the transmissibility of avian influenza viruses in humans at an early stage. The method is applied
to an outbreak of H7N7 avian influenza virus in The Netherlands that was the cause of more than 30 human-to-human
transmission events. The analyses indicate that secondary human-to-human transmission is plausible for the Dutch
household infection data. Based on the estimates of the within-household transmission parameters, we evaluate the
effectiveness of antiviral prophylaxis, and conclude that it is unlikely that all household infections can be prevented
with current antiviral drugs. We discuss the applicability of our method for the detection of emerging human-to-human
transmission of avian influenza viruses in particular, and for the analysis of within-household infection data in general.
Citation: van Boven M, Koopmans M, Du Ry van Beest Holle M, Meijer A, Klinkenberg D, et al. (2007) Detecting emerging transmissibility of avian influenza virus in human
households. PLoS Comput Biol 3(7): e145. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030145
Introduction
Outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian inﬂuenza in
Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa have devastating con-
sequences for poultry [1,2], and have resulted in numerous
infections in humans [3–5]. Although these infections from
the animal reservoir continue to accumulate, the virus does
not seem to spread extensively among humans. Nevertheless,
a fear is that these human infections may ultimately spark an
inﬂuenza pandemic [6–9]. Indeed, recent clusters of infec-
tions in human households hint at the possibility of virus
transmission from humans who were infected by poultry to
their household contacts [10,11]. These suggestions are
strengthened by the observation of mutations in recent
H5N1 viruses that seem to predispose the virus for more
efﬁcient transmission in mammals, including humans [12–16]
(but see [17–18]).
It is likely that a virus with pandemic potential will present
itself initially through an increase in the number of infections
in humans who have been in close contact with the case
infected by animals. Therefore, rapid detection and control
of clusters of infections is of key importance [7,9]. Such
clusters may result from (i) multiple introductions from the
animal reservoir (zoonotic transmission), (ii) multiple trans-
mission events from humans who were infected by animals
(primary human-to-human transmission), or (iii) multiple
transmission events from humans who were themselves
infected by humans (secondary human-to-human transmis-
sion). Obviously, evidence for (iii) is the most worrisome as it
indicates that the virus has acquired the ability to spread
efﬁciently in humans.
It is often thought that pathogens from the animal
reservoir that have made the jump to a new host species are
usually not (yet) well-adapted for sustained transmission in
the new host, and that transmissibility in a new species will
gradually increase over time by the process of adaptation by
means of natural selection [19–23]. Interestingly, however, in
the case of H5N1 avian inﬂuenza in humans, the evidence so
far does not seem to ﬁt this prediction [22–24]. Mechanisms
that could be responsible for the lack of efﬁcient secondary
human-to-human transmission could be due to a dose effect
whereby humans infected by animals receive a higher
infection dose than humans infected by humans, or to
behavioural changes after infection that limit spread of the
virus after it has been detected.
In this paper we develop a method to detect and quantify
different routes of virus transmission in a household setting.
Our main aim is to investigate whether within-household
pathogen transmission has been restricted to transmission
from the primary infected individual or whether there is
evidence that the transmission chain has extended beyond
the ﬁrst generation of human-to-human infections. Our
analyses are based on theoretical developments on the
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populations, which allow construction of ﬂexible methods
to analyse within-household transmission chains.
We apply the method to a recent study of within-
household transmission of highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza
of the H7N7 subtype that caused a large epidemic in poultry
in The Netherlands in 2003. Shortly after the detection of
virus circulation, the Dutch authorities undertook an
aggressive control strategy that consisted of an animal
movement ban in the affected regions, tracing and screening
suspected ﬂocks, and culling of infected and contiguous
ﬂocks. In all, a total of 255 ﬂocks became infected during a
period of nine weeks, and more than 30 million birds were
culled [25,26]. Subsequent studies of poultry workers
revealed that at least 86 infections from the animal reservoir
to humans had taken place [27–29]. In addition, more than
30 household contacts of the infected poultry workers who
had not been in direct contact with poultry were reported
positive. These reports indicate that human-to-human trans-
mission did occur from individuals infected from the animal
reservoir.
Here we analyse data of the transmission chains in 24
households that led to 33 human-to-human transmission
events, measuring the extent of onward transmission from
humans who were infected by humans (i.e., secondary human-
to-human transmission). We complement the statistical anal-
yses by systematic (post-hoc) power analyses to obtain insight
into the study size needed to be able to ﬁnd signiﬁcant
secondary human-to-human transmission, given that it is
present.
Although we have applied the method to a speciﬁc dataset,
we believe that our method is of general interest as it enables
rapid estimation of within-household transmission rates
based on data that are easily gathered for most infectious
diseases. For instance, our method of analysis is not restricted
to the analysis of emerging pandemic inﬂuenza, but it can just
as well be used to estimate different routes of within-
household transmission rates of human inﬂuenza A viruses
[30–32] and, importantly, to assess the potential effectiveness
of control measures.
Materials and Methods
Data
Based on evidence of human-to-human transmission of
H7N7 avian inﬂuenza virus that was the cause of the outbreak
among poultry in The Netherlands [27], a retrospective
cohort study was undertaken to determine the extent of
human-to-human transmission in households of infected
poultry workers [28–29]. Brieﬂy, the families of 63 of 86
poultry workers who were found positive agreed to partic-
ipate in the study. Of these, 39 households were excluded
because direct contact of the household members with
infected birds could not be ruled out. Our dataset thus
contained 24 households with a single conﬁrmed H7N7
infected poultry worker. There were no indications of an age
bias or sex bias in our study population, and the distribution
of household sizes in our study was not untypical for the
Dutch population [29]. In total, 33 of 56 household members
of individuals who were classiﬁed as an index case had
antibodies to H7N7 virus (Table 1), in contrast with a group
of recently vaccinated age-matched and region-matched
controls who were all seronegative [33]. For most of the
individuals who were classiﬁed as positive, the main symptom
of infection was conjunctivitis (an infection of the eye), which
may have been the point of entry and site of virus
multiplication [27–29].
Final Size Distribution
The statistical analyses are based on the distributions of the
ﬁnal size (the total number infected in a household) as a
function of the household size [34–35], obtained using an
SEIR epidemiological model in which individuals are classi-
ﬁed as susceptible (S), latently infected (infected but not yet
infectious) (E), infectious (I), and recovered and immune (R).
No a priori assumptions are made regarding the duration or
distribution of the latent and infectious periods. We consider
a model with two types of individuals, and assume that there
are no individuals who have prior immunity (a plausible
assumption for an emerging pathogen). The mathematical
equations determining the distribution of the ﬁnal size of the
household outbreaks are given in Text S1.
The ﬁnal size equation in Text S1 is quite general. The data
of the Dutch epidemiological study are more speciﬁc and
allow a number of simpliﬁcations in the ﬁnal size equation. In
particular, the epidemiological study focused on households
in which only the initially infected individual had acquired
the infection from the animal reservoir, while the other
household members had had no contact with infected
poultry. We assume that type 1 individuals are infected from
the animal reservoir and that type 2 individuals are
susceptible to infection by humans. The focus in our analyses
is on b
 
21, the transmission rate parameter from the person
infected from the animal reservoir to its household members
(primary human-to-human transmission), and b
 
22, the trans-
mission rate parameter from humans who are infected by
humans (secondary human-to-human transmission).
Scenarios
In the analyses, we consider four scenarios that are deﬁned
by the assumptions regarding the distribution of the
infectious period and the mechanism of pathogen trans-
mission. With respect to the infectious period, we focus on
two extremes, one in which the infectious period is
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Author Summary
Recent outbreaks of emerging diseases such as SARS and H5N1
avian influenza have underlined the fact that animal pathogens may
acquire the ability to spread efficiently in humans. Monitoring the
transmissibility of pathogens from the animal reservoir in humans is
key for early detection of epidemic spread, and for effective control.
Here we have used data from a small but well-defined study of
H7N7 avian influenza virus transmission in human households to
estimate the transmissibility of H7N7 avian influenza in humans
living in close contact. The analyses make use of household final size
data (i.e., the number of individuals in the household who are
ultimately infected), which, for many pathogens, are easily collected.
For the H7N7 data, the analyses indicate that the transmission chain
in humans may well have extended beyond the first generation of
infections in humans, and that less than half of the household
infections could have been prevented by antiviral prophylaxis. Our
method of analysis provides a rapid and generally applicable tool
that can be used to monitor emerging human transmissibility of
pathogens from the animal reservoir.
Household Transmission of Emerging Pathogensexponentially distributed (the ‘‘general stochastic epidemic’’)
and one in which the infectious period is of ﬁxed duration
(the ‘‘Reed-Frost’’ model) [34–36].
With respect to the mechanism of virus transmission within
the household, we assume that transmission is frequency-
dependent or density-dependent [37]. In a frequency-
dependent model, the number of contacts per unit of time
is ﬁxed, and the transmission rate is proportional to the
relative frequency (prevalence) of infectious individuals. In a
density-dependent model, the number of contacts per unit of
time is proportional to the number of individuals. Hence, in a
frequency-dependent model, the transmission rate in a
household of two individuals of which one is infectious
equals the transmission rate in a household of four of which
two are infectious. In a density-dependent model, the
transmission rate in the latter household would be twice as
high as in the former. Notice that the dimension of the
transmission parameter b
 
ij of the density-dependent model is
deﬁned per individual per unit time, while the transmission
parameter bij of the frequency-dependent model is deﬁned
per unit time. Notice furthermore that bij can be interpreted
as the expected number of type i infections that would be
caused by a type j infected individual over the course of its
infectious period in a large population of susceptibles if time
is measured in units of the infectious period [38]. Further
details are given Text S1.
Statistical Analysis and Model Selection
With the computed ﬁnal size distributions and household
ﬁnal size data at hand, it is straightforward to estimate the
parameters of interest by means of maximum likelihood [30–
32], and to calculate the corresponding conﬁdence intervals/
areas on the basis of likelihood ratio tests.
To evaluate whether secondary human-to-human trans-
mission has taken place, and to choose between models of
different complexity, we make use of the Akaike Information
Criterion adjusted for small sample size (AICc) [39]. We focus
on a set of one-parameter models with no secondary human-
to-human transmission (i.e., b
 
22 ¼ 0o rb22 ¼ 0), a set of one-
parameter models with no difference between primary and
secondary human-to-human transmission (b
 
22 ¼ b
 
21 or b22 ¼
b21), and a set of two-parameter models in which both
transmission parameters are estimated.
The difference Di ¼ A/Ci   A/Cmin measures the support for
model i. In general, the larger Di, the less plausible the model
is. The model weights or supports wi ¼
exp½ 0:5Di 
Rjexp½ 0:5Dj  can be
interpreted as the probability that model i is the best among
the ones considered [39].
Power Analysis
The size of the Dutch study that inspired our analyses was
fairly small (24 households). This may be typical for emerging
pathogens from zoonotic origins that have not (yet) acquired
the ability to spread efﬁciently among humans. Therefore, we
performed power analyses to evaluate for which effect sizes
(i.e., transmission rate parameter values) and study designs
(i.e., number of households) secondary human-to-human
transmission can be detected by our method. In particular,
we carried out post-hoc power analyses of the Dutch
epidemiological study taking the estimated parameter values
of Table 2, and assuming different sizes of the epidemio-
logical study. In addition, we used simulated datasets in which
primary and secondary human-to-human transmission were
equally efﬁcient in order to determine the minimal study size
that would be necessary for detection of secondary human-to-
human transmission.
For each parameter constellation, we carried out 1,000
simulations and re-estimated the parameters of the simulated
data as described in the above sections. We focused either on
simulated datasets that contained 24 households with the
household distribution as in Table 1, or on simulated datasets
Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Transmission Rate Parameters of the Models Described in the Text
Model Description Model ID Parameter Estimate
(95% CI)
Akaike Information Criterion (AICc) Percent Support
No secondary transmission 1A b*21 ¼ 0.89 (0.61–1.2) 57.15 10.2
1B b*21 ¼ 1.2 (0.64–2.3) 54.64 35.8
Equal primary and secondary transmission 2A b*21 ¼ b*22 ¼ 0.40 (0.27–0.56) 56.34 15.3
2B b*21 ¼ b*22 ¼ 0.51 (0.30–0.85) 59.21 3.6
Full model 3A b*21 ¼ 0.61 (0.34–1.0) 55.54 22.8
b*22¼ 0.21 (0.0038–0.46)
3B b*21 ¼ 1.1 (0.46–2.2) 56.81 12.1
b*22 ¼ 0.071 (0–0.51)
Models 1A, 2A, and 3A assume an infectious period of fixed duration, while models 1B, 2B, and 3B assume an exponentially distributed infectious period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030145.t002
Table 1. Overview of the Household Final Size Infection Data of
Highly Pathogenic H7N7 Avian Influenza Virus That Caused a
Major Outbreak among Poultry in The Netherlands in 2003
Number Infected Household Size (Number of People)
234578
1 8 01000
2 4 02000
3 — 11200
4 — — 3000
5— — — 0 0 1
6 ————0 0
7 ————1 0
8 —————0
Number of households 12 1 7 2 1 1
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030145.t001
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Household Transmission of Emerging Pathogensthat contained a multiple of 24 households, while keeping the
distribution of household sizes as in Table 1.
Antiviral Prophylaxis
To evaluate the potential efﬁcacy of prophylactic antiviral
drug treatment, we calculate household ﬁnal size distribu-
tions and expected household outbreak sizes if all household
members take antiviral drugs. The baseline transmission
parameters are as in Table 2. Antiviral drugs reduce the
susceptibility of uninfected individuals by a factor 1-AVES,
where AVES is the antiviral efﬁcacy for susceptibility, and the
infectiousness of infected individuals by a factor 1-AVEI
where AVEI is the antiviral efﬁcacy for infectiousness [40–43].
Since all individuals infected from the animal reservoir were
already taking antiviral prophylaxis [27–28], the transmission
rate parameters b
 
21 and b
 
22 (or b
 
21 9 and b
 
22 9) in a household
that is on antiviral therapy are b21 9 ¼ (1   AVES)b21 and b22 9 , ¼
(1 – AVEI)(1 – AVES) b22, respectively. In line with previous
studies [9,42–43], we assume in our default scenario that
antiviral drug treatment reduces the susceptibility to in-
fection weakly (AVES ¼ 0.3), and the infectiousness once
infected moderately (AVEI ¼ 0.6).
A recent study estimated the antiviral efﬁcacies for
susceptibility to infection with illness (AVESD) and antiviral
efﬁcacy for infectiousness at AVESD ¼ 0.85 and AVEI ¼ 0.66
[40–41]. In the Results and Table S4, we therefore also
consider scenarios with higher antiviral efﬁcacies for suscept-
ibility and infectiousness. Speciﬁcally, we have also consid-
ered AVES¼0.6 and AVEI¼0.66, i.e., antiviral drug treatment
reduces the overall incidence of infection to a lesser extent
than the incidence of symptomatic infection.
Results
Estimation of Household Transmission Rates
We consider three scenarios for virus spread within a
household after an introduction from the animal reservoir.
First, we assume that all household infections are the result of
transmission from the person originally infected by the
animal reservoir (model 1). Second, we assume that there are
no differences in the transmission rates from human cases
infected by the animal reservoir and from human cases
infected by humans (model 2). Third, we consider a model in
which these human-to-human transmission rates are esti-
mated separately (model 3). Within each model we assume
that transmission is either frequency-dependent or density-
dependent, and that the infectious period is either ﬁxed or
highly variable (see Materials and Methods), yielding four
scenarios per model (models 1A–1D, models 2A–2D, and
models 3A–3D).
The results show that there is no single model or scenario
that is exclusively favored by the data, although the density-
dependent transmission scenarios ﬁt the data considerably
better than the frequency-dependent scenarios (Table S1). In
fact, the combined support for the density-dependent
scenarios is 83.6% versus 16.4% for the frequency-dependent
scenarios. Therefore, we will from this point onward focus on
the density-dependent scenarios only. The results of the
analyses are summarized in Figure 1 and Table 2.
For the model with the highest support (model 1B), the
maximum likelihood estimate of the transmission rate
parameter for primary human-to-human transmission is 1.2
(95% CI ¼ 0.64–2.3). This implies that the expected numbers
of human-to human infections (excluding the primary case)
in households of sizes four and eight are 1.6 and 3.8,
respectively (Table 3). For the second ranking model (model
3A), the transmission rate parameters for primary and
secondary human-to-human transmission are 0.61 (0.34–1.0)
Figure 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Transmission Rate
Parameters for the Model 3A (Top Panel) and Model 3B (Bottom Panel)
Described in the Text (Black Dots), with Contours of the 90%, 95%, and
99% Confidence Areas
The maximum likelihood parameter estimates of models that exclude
secondary human-to-human transmission (b*22 ¼ 0, models 1A and 1B),
and that assume equal primary and secondary human-to-human
transmission (b*22 ¼ b*21, models 2A and 2B), are also indicated (grey
dots).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030145.g001
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Household Transmission of Emerging Pathogensand 0.21 (0.0038–0.46), and the expected numbers of human-
to-human infections in households of size four and eight are
1.7 and 5.4, respectively.
The four models with more than 10% support can be
divided in two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of models 1B
and 3B, which have a highly variable infectious period, and no
(model 1B) or very little (model 3B) secondary human-to-
human transmission. The second group contains models 2A
and 3A, which have a ﬁxed infectious period and signiﬁcant
secondary transmission. Apparently, the data are best
explained by some differentiation in within-household
infectivity, either by probabilistic differences between the
primary infecteds (models 1B and 3B) or by differences in
infectivity due to the inclusion of secondary human-to-
human transmission (models 2A and 3A).
The test that detects H7N7 antibodies in humans has high
sensitivity and speciﬁcity [30]. Nevertheless, it is possible that
the dataset includes a small number of false positives. To
investigate this possibility, we reanalysed the data assuming
85% test speciﬁcity. Under this assumption, the transmission
rate parameters are consistently slightly lower than in Table 2
and Table S1, but the results are otherwise in good agreement
with our default scenario (Table S2). In addition, we
reanalysed the data when one or both of the large households
with a high proportion of test positives are excluded from the
analyses (Table 1). The results are similar to those presented
in Table 2 and Table S1, the trend being that the frequency-
dependent transmission models now have slightly higher
support (Table S3).
Power Analysis
The above results indicate that, on the one hand, secondary
human-to-human transmission is plausible if variation in the
infectious period is limited, but, on the other hand, may not
be necessary if there is substantial variation in the infectious
period. Unfortunately, there is to date not enough informa-
tion to decide which model is more plausible. Therefore, to
investigate to what extent our results are a consequence of
our small study size, we have carried out a number of power
analyses.
Figure 2 shows the results of a post-hoc power analysis of
model 3B (exponentially distributed infectious period,
separate estimation of primary and secondary human-to-
human transmission), which yielded a low but positive rate of
secondary human-to-human transmission. The top panel
shows the point estimates of the transmission rate parameters
of 1,000 simulations of a population of 24 households, taking
the estimated parameter values of Table 2 (b*21¼1.1 and b*22
¼ 0.071). The analyses show that although 668 of 1,000
simulations yield estimates of the full model with b*22 . 0, in
the statistical comparison only 263 of the 1,000 simulations
favour a model that includes secondary human-to-human
transmission. Apparently, the more parsimonious model
without secondary human-to-human transmission that con-
tains only one parameter is most of the times favoured over
the full model that does include secondary human-to-human
transmission but contains two parameters. If the study size is
increased from 24 to 96 households, the number of
simulations that yield estimates with b*22 . 0 increases to
877 of 1,000 (Figure 2, bottom panel). The number of
simulations that support models that include secondary
human-to-human transmission also increases to 381 of
1,000. If the number of households is increased still further,
the support for models that include secondary human-to-
human transmission increases still further (unpublished
data).
To further investigate the relation between pathogen
transmissibility and the ability of our method to distinguish
primary from secondary human-to-human transmission in a
general setting, we carried out simulations assuming that
primary and secondary human-to-human transmission are
equally efﬁcient (b*22¼b*21), and estimated the transmission
parameters as described above. The results are summarized in
Figure 3. If there is very little human-to-human transmission,
there are few infection events in the households, and our
method yields low support (57%) for models that include
secondary human-to-human transmission (model 1, no
secondary transmission: 43%; model 2, equal primary and
secondary transmission: 43%; full model: 14%). If the
efﬁciency of human-to-human transmission is increased, the
support for models that include secondary human-to-human
transmission increases, especially for the model with a ﬁxed
infectious period. For the model with a ﬁxed infectious
period, the highest support is 98% at b*22 ¼ b*21 ¼ 0.6
(individual
 1 * infectious period
 1), while for the model with
an exponentially distributed infectious period it is 91% at
b*22 ¼ b*21 ¼ 1.4 (individual
 1 * infectious period
 1). If
human-to-human transmission is very efﬁcient, most house-
hold members are infected, and the method has difﬁculties
distinguishing between primary and secondary human-to-
human transmission. As a consequence, the support for
models that include secondary human-to-human transmis-
sion decreases with increasing human-to-human transmissi-
bility if human-to-human transmissibility is already efﬁcient.
Antiviral Prophylaxis
During the Dutch outbreak of H7N7 inﬂuenza virus in
poultry, prophylactic treatment with the antiviral drug
oseltamivir was given to poultry workers but not to their
household members. Given the observation of considerable
Table 3. The Expected Outbreak Size and Probability of No
Human-to-Human Transmission (Number between Brackets) in
Households of Sizes Four and Eight, Respectively
Model
Description
Model
ID
No
Treatment
Antiviral
Treatment
N ¼ 4N ¼ 8N ¼ 4N ¼ 8
No secondary
transmission
1A 1.8 (0.07) 4.1 (0.00) 1.4 (0.15) 3.3 (0.13)
1B 1.6 (0.22) 3.8 (0.11) 1.4 (0.29) 3.2 (0.15)
Equal primary and
secondary transmission
2A 1.5 (0.30) 5.9 (0.06) 1.0 (0.43) 4.5 (0.14)
2B 1.4 (0.40) 4.7 (0.22) 1.0 (0.48) 3.8 (0.29)
Full model 3A 1.7 (0.16) 5.4 (0.01) 1.1 (0.28) 3.1 (0.05)
3B 1.6 (0.24) 4.1 (0.12) 1.3 (0.31) 3.1 (0.16)
Parameter values are as in Table 2. The primary infection is not included in the household
outbreak size. The columns under the heading Antiviral Treatment give the expected
household final size if all household members take antiviral drugs. The antiviral efficacies
for susceptibility (AVES) and infectiousness (AVEI)a r eAVES ¼ 0.3 and AVEI ¼ 0.6,
respectively. See Table S4 for additional analyses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030145.t003
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Household Transmission of Emerging Pathogenswithin-household human-to-human transmission, considera-
tion should be given to offering prophylactic treatment with
antiviral drugs to all household members of a person at risk
of infection. The natural question is to ask how effective such
a strategy would have been, given estimates of household
transmission parameters (Table 2) and parameters determin-
ing the efﬁcacy of antiviral drugs [9,40–43].
For the Dutch study population (Table 1), the expected
numbers of household infections for the three most plausible
models and parameter estimates of Table 2 are 30.3 (model
1B), 32.7 (model 3A), and 30.1 (model 2A). This corresponds
well with the actual number of household infections (33) in
the dataset of Table 1. Recalculating the expected number of
household infections using conservative estimates of the
antiviral efﬁcacies for susceptibility and infectiousness (AVES
¼ 0.3 and AVEI ¼ 0.6) [9,42–43] yields expected numbers of
household infections of 25.3 (model 1B), 21.5 (model 3A), and
21.8 (model 2A). If antiviral prophylaxis is assumed to be
more effective (AVES ¼ 0.6 and AVEI ¼ 0.66) [40–41], the
expected numbers of household infections are 18.0 (model
1B), 12.9 (model 3A), and 11.7 (model 2A). Hence, for the
Dutch study, prophylactic treatment would have been able to
prevent 5–11 of the more than 30 household infections if
antiviral drugs are moderately efﬁcacious, and 12–20 house-
hold infections if the efﬁcacy of antiviral drugs is higher.
Table 3 shows the results of a systematic analysis of the
efﬁcacy of prophylactic antiviral treatment for households of
four and eight persons. The analyses show that the number of
human-to-human infections can be decreased to some extent
by targeted antiviral therapy, although it is unlikely that all
household infections can be prevented. In Table 3, we have
assumed that antiviral drug treatment reduces susceptibility
and infectiousness moderately. In Table S4, we investigate the
robustness of the results of Table 3 by increasing the antiviral
efﬁcacies for susceptibility and infectiousness. The analyses in
Table S4 show that the number of household infections
decreases with increasing antiviral efﬁcacy for susceptibility
or infectiousness. Still, it is unlikely that all household
infections can be prevented. We conclude that complete
prevention of close-contact infections with current antiviral
drugs is probably not within reach, at least not for the H7N7
avian inﬂuenza virus that caused the outbreak in poultry in
The Netherlands, and which was the cause of dozens of
human infections.
Discussion
We have presented a method to quantify different routes of
transmission of avian inﬂuenza virus in human households,
and applied the method to an epidemiological study that was
carried out after a large outbreak of H7N7 avian inﬂuenza
virus in poultry in The Netherlands. Although the size of the
study is relatively small, it is the most detailed investigation of
household transmission of avian inﬂuenza virus thus far and
therefore forms a good starting point to evaluate methods
aimed at quantifying human-to-human transmission of avian
inﬂuenza viruses. Households in which additional bird-to-
human transmission could not be ruled out were excluded in
order to be able to focus solely on different routes of human-
to-human transmission. The methods, however, are also
applicable to the situation where the source of the human
infections (animal or human) is not known.
The ability of our method to distinguish between primary
and secondary human-to-human transmission is determined
by the distribution of the ﬁnal size within households. If
secondary human-to-human transmission is efﬁcient (i.e.,
such that it can lead to a sustained chain of infections in
sufﬁciently large populations of susceptibles), epidemiolog-
ical theory informs that the ﬁnal size distribution is expected
Figure 2. Post-Hoc Power Analysis of Model 3B (i.e., Assuming an
Exponentially Distributed Infectious Period)
The top panel (n¼24) shows the parameter estimates of 1,000 simulated
outbreaks in a population of 24 households with size distribution as in
Table 1 and with the parameter values as estimated in Table 2. The
bottom panel (n ¼96) shows the results of the analyses in the case that
the number of households is increased fourfold.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030145.g002
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Household Transmission of Emerging Pathogensto be bimodal [38], while if there is no or little secondary
human-to-human transmission the ﬁnal size distribution is
expected to remain unimodal (see Text S1 for details). As the
power analyses have shown, our method works best for
intermediate transmission rates, since then the difference
between scenarios with reproduction numbers smaller and
higher than 1 is most pronounced. This also explains the
difference in Figure 3 between the models, assuming a ﬁxed
or exponentially distributed infectious period, as the prob-
ability of a minor outbreak is, for a ﬁxed value of the
reproduction number, smaller if the infectious period is of
ﬁxed duration than if it is exponentially distributed [34].
Given these results, it would be interesting to know the actual
distribution of the infectious period of avian inﬂuenza viruses
in humans. Unfortunately, for avian inﬂuenza virus infections
in humans, very little is known about the duration and the
distribution of the duration of the infectious period. For
human inﬂuenza viruses, more is known about the duration
of the infectious period. For instance, a detailed analysis of
H3N2 human inﬂuenza virus data indicated that the mean
infectious period was about four days, with very little
variation around the mean [44]. At present, however, it is
unclear if and how these results of human-adapted strains can
be translated to strains that are not (yet) adapted for
transmission among humans.
Our post-hoc power analyses furthermore indicate that if
secondary human-to-human transmission is fairly inefﬁcient
(i.e., if b*22 is small enough so that no prolonged infection
chain is possible in a large population of susceptibles), it can
still be detected using fairly small studies that contain a few
dozens of households (e.g., n ¼ 96 in Figure 2). If, however,
secondary human-to-human transmission is very inefﬁcient,
larger study sizes are needed, probably containing several
hundreds of households, to unequivocally demonstrate the
existence of secondary human-to-human transmission. In
other words, our method is well-suited to detect animal
pathogens that are on the verge of obtaining the ability for
continued spread in humans.
Our general power analyses in Figure 3 also have shown
that our model is able to detect efﬁcient secondary human-
to-human transmission with very small study sizes (e.g., n¼24
in Figure 3). Perhaps surprisingly, the method works best
when transmission rates are intermediate, because then the
difference between models that include or exclude secondary
human-to-human transmission is most pronounced. It would
be interesting to investigate whether these types of phenom-
ena are also observed in other and more general two-type
epidemic models for the spread of pathogens within house-
holds [21–23].
For the Dutch outbreak, our results show that there is some
but no conclusive evidence of secondary human-to-human
virus transmission. In fact, the combined support for the four
models that exclude secondary human-to-human transmis-
sion (models 1A–1D) is 39.8%, while the combined support
for the eight models that do include secondary human-to-
human transmission (models 2A–2D and 3A–3D) is only
60.2% (Table S1). In addition, the model with the highest
individual support (model 1B) has a support of 29.9% and
does not include secondary transmission (Table S1). More-
over, if both transmission parameters are estimated sepa-
rately (models 3A–3D), the estimates of secondary human-to-
human transmission are consistently much lower than the
estimates of primary human-to-human transmission. These
results suggest that humans infected by animals transmit the
virus fairly efﬁciently to other humans, but that humans
infected by other humans do not efﬁciently pass the virus on
to other humans.
It is tempting to speculate that the observed difference
between primary and secondary human-to-human trans-
mission is due to a dose effect, i.e., that humans infected by
humans had been infected with a lower number of virus
particles than humans who were infected by poultry.
Unfortunately, independent evidence of the ‘‘degree of
infection’’ that could corroborate this suggestion is lacking.
An alternative explanation that could conceivably explain the
observed difference between primary and secondary human-
to-human transmission would involve changes in behavior
whereby people become more careful in preventing risky
contacts after the index case shows signs of illness. Again,
evidence supporting or against this hypothesis is lacking.
Often, it is assumed that the transmissibility of an emerging
pathogen will increase as more individuals are infected,
because it allows the pathogen to adapt to the new host species
[20]. However, if anything, our analyses have shown that
secondary human-to-human transmission is less efﬁcient than
primary human-to-human transmission, in contrast with
conventional wisdom. A possibility that is invariably over-
lookedisthatwithin-hostselectionofavianinﬂuenzavirusesin
human hosts does not select for higher but rather for lower
transmissibility. Theoretical studies focusing on evolution of
the dispersal rate in a metapopulation context indicate that
this is a theoretical possibility [45]. Empirical studies with
ferretsfocusingonthetransmissibilityofH5N1avianinﬂuenza
viruses have begun to unravel the evolutionary pathways of
these viruses [17–18], and indicate that evolutionary adapta-
Figure 3. Average Support for Models That Include Secondary Human-
to-Human Transmission for 1,000 Simulated Datasets of 24 Households
with Equal Primary and Secondary Human-to-Human Transmission (b*22
¼ b*21)
The ordinate shows the combined support for the one-parameter model
with b*22 ¼ b*21 (model 2) and the two-parameter model in which b*21
and b*22 are estimated separately (model 3). Black dots refer to
simulations with a fixed infectious period, and open dots represents
simulations with an exponentially distributed infectious period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0030145.g003
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Household Transmission of Emerging Pathogenstion in mammals is a multifaceted process that is unlikely to
lead to simple maximization of the transmission rate.
Our analyses indicate that the beneﬁt of giving antiviral
drugs to household members of an infected individual in
terms of reducing the number of infections would have been
modest. In fact, for the study population of Table 1, the
results show that the number of household infections could
have been decreased from more than 30 to 22–25 if antiviral
drugs are moderately effective, and to 12–18 if antiviral drugs
are more effective. This is due to the fact that antiviral drugs
provide only partial protection against infection and shed-
ding, while the estimate of the transmission rate of primary
human-to-human transmission is relatively high. If the
baseline transmission parameters are decreased, the potential
effectiveness of antiviral treatment increases (unpublished
data), in line with the observation that control measures
usually are most effective whenever the basic reproduction
number is close to 1 [9,38,43]. Alternatively, if the baseline
transmission parameters are increased, the effectiveness of
antiviral prophylaxis decreases.
Although our analyses suggest that antiviral drugs are only
moderately effective in reducing the number of household
infections, we do not intend to suggest that antiviral drug
treatment should or should not be used as prophylaxis against
avian inﬂuenza viruses. In fact, it may well be that even though
prophylactic antiviral drug treatment is only moderately
effective in preventing the number of human infections, it
may still be quite effective in reducing the disease symptoms
of individuals who are infected [40–41]. On the other hand, it
is also possible that by reducing the disease symptoms,
individuals who are infected will in effect be more infectious
because they are less likely to remain bedridden. Studies
quantifying the relation between disease and infectiousness
(i.e., viral titers in the upper respiratory tract) are needed to
answer this question.
Finally, with the number of H5N1 infections in humans
accumulating at a steady pace, it is important to keep track of
the ability of this virus to enhance its transmissibility in
humans [7]. At present, however, there is still a conspicuous
lack of data pertaining to the possibility of human-to-human
spread of H5N1 viruses. In our opinion, detailed investiga-
tions of infected individuals, as well as tracing and inves-
tigation of the individuals in close contact with a conﬁrmed
case, should become an integral part of the handling of each
human H5N1 infection.
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